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JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Wednesday - 15 April 1970

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1. [REDACTED] LLM) Mrs. Lasser, in the office of Representative Claude Pepper (D., Fla.), called on behalf of a constituent engaged in the manufacture of pistols who wished to make a presentation to the Agency. Mr. Jack Blake, Director of Logistics, arranged for a meeting for Mr. [REDACTED]

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25X1A [REDACTED] Mrs. Lasser was very pleased that we were able to arrange this on such short notice and said the Congressman would be grateful.

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2. [REDACTED] GLC) Hand-carried to Ed Braswell, Senate Armed Services Committee staff, a paper prepared by OER on "Strength and Deployment of North Vietnam, Laos, and South Vietnam Enemy Forces" as a followup to George Carver's briefing of Senator Stennis and Braswell on Indochina. Braswell said this was precisely what they needed and asked if we could obtain similar information for Cambodia.

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3. [REDACTED] GLC) Met with George Murphy, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy staff, and left with him a blind memorandum on Soviet motivations for Plowshare which he had requested. In response to a query from me, Murphy said that the Committee's shorthand reporter was running behind on Committee transcripts and he would be in touch with us as soon as the transcript of our briefing was available for our review.

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4. [REDACTED] GLC) Met with Miss Jardine, Personal Secretary to Senator Daniel Inouye (D., Hawaii), and firmed up arrangements for the Senator's talk to the Advanced Intelligence Seminar on the Hill tomorrow.

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14 April 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant for  
Vietnamese Affairs

SUBJECT : Stennis Request for Enemy  
OB Data

The attached statement is provided to fulfill  
your commitment to Senator Stennis to furnish him  
a statement on NVA military force levels in North  
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

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Deputy Director  
Economic Research

Attachment:

Strength and Deployment of  
North Vietnam, Laos, and South  
Vietnam Enemy Forces, dated  
14 April 70

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MEMORANDUM

Strength and Deployment of North Vietnam,  
Laos, and South Vietnam Enemy Forces

1. There were an estimated 375,000 military and security personnel stationed within North Vietnam at the end of 1969. The size of these forces has remained relatively constant over the past two years. Major ground combat units in North Vietnam include elements of 7 infantry divisions, 1 infantry brigade, and 1 artillery division. A breakdown of the Armed Forces by type of service is shown below:

December 1969

Army	330,000
Navy	3,000
Air Force	10,000
Armed Public Security Forces	16,000
Regional Forces	16,000
Total	<u>375,000*</u>

\*An additional 15,000 personnel stationed within the geographical boundaries of North Vietnam are considered as part of the direct military threat to Allied Forces in South Vietnam and hence are carried in the enemy order of battle for South Vietnam.

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2. Enemy forces in Laos in October 1969 totaled 115,000, of which about 67,000 were NVA (including advisors and filler personnel) and about 48,000 Pathet Lao (including dissident neutralists). A breakout of these forces between North and South Laos is shown in the table below:

	<u>NVA</u>	<u>Pathet Lao<sup>a</sup>/</u>	<u>Total</u>
North Laos	23,900	23,100 <sup>b</sup> /	47,000
South Laos	21,200	12,400	33,600
Command/ Support <sup>c</sup> /	18,000	16,400	34,400
	<u>63,100</u>	<u>51,900</u>	<u>115,000</u>

a. Figures for the Pathet Lao forces include an estimated 3,500 NVA advisors and fillers in North and South Laos, giving a total NVA force of 67,000 men.

b. This figure includes an estimated 3,000 dissident neutralists.

c. To date, no reliable methodology has been developed to allocate command and support by geographic area. However, a large but unknown portion of the total figure are subordinate to elements of the 559th Transportation Group, whose primary function is to provide logistical support for the war in South Vietnam.

3. The Communist force levels in Laos have been increasing for the past several years. The Pathet Lao more than doubled the size of their own forces after 1962 but in recent years there has been little or no increase in their strength, due, in part at least, to the movement of the population out of PL-controlled areas. The buildup of NVA forces, on the other hand, has continued and they now outnumber Pathet Lao forces. Although part of the growth of NVA strength is due to the expansion of the 559th Transportation Group in South Laos, there has also been an increase in NVA combat forces in both North and South Laos over the

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past several years. Since the last half of 1969, NVA forces have increased by 10,000-12,000 as a result of the deployment of a full division and support elements into North Laos for the recent dry season campaign.

4. Despite the infiltration of an estimated 350,000-420,000 NVA personnel into South Vietnam during 1968 and 1969, the number of NVA personnel operating in the South is estimated to have declined by about 15,000 during the same period. Of the total combat and support elements (Main and Local Forces and Administrative Services) in South Vietnam, NVA personnel accounted for about 50 percent at the end of 1967. By the end of 1969, the percentage of NVA personnel equaled about 60 percent of these forces. A breakdown of these forces is shown below:

	<u>In Thousands</u>	
	<u>Dec 67</u>	<u>Dec 69</u>
<b>Main and Local Forces</b>		
NVA	95-105	85- 95
VC	70- 80	35- 45
Subtotal	<u>165-185</u>	<u>120-140</u>
<b>Administrative Services</b>		
NVA	25- 35	20- 30
VC	50- 65	35- 45
Subtotal	<u>75-100</u>	<u>55- 75</u>
TOTAL	<u>240-285</u>	<u>175-215</u>
Of which NVA	120-140	105-125